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A PROSPECT THEORY OF PRIVACY 
BRYAN H. CHOI* 
ABSTRACT 
Privacy law has languished for decades while the other information law 
doctrines have flourished. This paradox can be explained by the relative 
weight assigned respectively to moral argument versus economic argu-
ment. 
Privacy law is unique in that it continues to be steered foremost by moral 
intuition. What qualifies as a “violation” of privacy is predicated largely 
on the moral reprehensibility of the act in question. By stark contrast, the 
intellectual property regimes have long since converted to being led pri-
marily by economic considerations, and only secondarily by non-
economic factors. 
That distinction is counterproductive and nonsensical. Personal data is an 
informational good like any other. The same economic justifications for 
intellectual “property” can be extended to intellectual “privacy”—
nonexclusivity harms the incentives to generate new information that can 
further the progress of social knowledge. 
Where moral rhetoric has failed to advance robust recognition of privacy 
interests, economic reasoning may prove more effective. In particular, this 
Essay offers Edmund Kitch’s prospect theory as an important counter-
weight to prior economic critiques of privacy, which have frowned on re-
straints on alienation of information. Prospect theory shows that the social 
value of recognizing exclusive claims is not just to shield information that 
already exists, but also to shield deeper investigations of that information 
to unearth further information that would not be otherwise discoverable. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Data libertarianism is driving us toward data poverty, not data wealth. The 
rise of Big Data has spawned exuberant optimism that personal data is a bountiful 
harvest that will never run dry. Private companies, researchers, and governments 
alike are eager to capitalize on a gold rush of information that purports to solve all 
problems except the problem of privacy.1 Data mining is the new alchemy, and the 
fount of personal data is seemingly infinite.2 
The anticipated response has been that the crowd would embrace data trans-
parency and spurn those who clung to anachronistic expectations of privacy.3 But it 
has not turned out that way. The crowd has become skeptical of social-media plat-
forms designed to harvest data, and is looking increasingly for tools that destroy 
data before it can be plundered.4 Privacy is not dead.  
The mood has changed. We are beginning to see personal data as a liability, 
not an asset.5 If we cannot control it, then no one else should have it. Why partici-
pate in social networks, why leave comments on websites, why take any risks 
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., Jonathan Shaw, Why “Big Data” Is a Big Deal, HARV. MAG., Mar. 2014, at 30, 
34; Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 2013. 
 2. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (Mar. 24, 
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2413974 (arguing that we need a “post-scarcity 
economics” in a world where the cost of production and distribution of information is effectively zero). 
 3. Michael Zimmer, Mark Zuckerberg’s Theory of Privacy, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2014), (“in a 
2008 interview at the Web 2.0 Summit . . . Zuckerberg predicted that the amount of information people will 
share online will double each year . . . .”); Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over It’, WIRED (Jan. 26, 
1999). 
 4. See, e.g., Michelle Cottle, The Adultery Arms Race, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 2014 (describing 
apps like Snapchat and TigerText that cause messages to “self-destruct”); Help Center, KIK, 
https://kikinteractive.zendesk.com/entries/95570573-My-messages-are-all-gone-what-happened- (last visit-
ed Apr. 22, 2015) (“Your chat history is cleared when . . . [y]ou login to your account on a different device . 
. . .”); Farid Fadaie, Building an Engine for Decentralized Communications, BITTORRENT BLOG (July 30, 
2014), http://blog.bittorrent.com/2014/07/30/building-an-engine-for-decentralized-communications/ (“Bit-
Torrent does not track or store information on who is communicating with whom, or when communications 
happen. We are not even storing data temporarily on servers and then deleting it. We never have the 
metadata in the first place.”); Christopher “moot” Poole, The Case for Anonymity Online, TED (filmed Feb. 
2010), http://www.ted.com/talks/christopher_m00t_poole_the_case_for_anonymity_online?language=en 
(“[W]hat’s unique about [4Chan] is that it’s anonymous, and it has no memory. There’s no archive, there 
are no barriers, there’s no registration.”); Ladar Levison, Secrets, Lies and Snowden’s Email: Why I Was 
Forced to Shut Down Lavabit, THE GUARDIAN (May 20, 2014, 7:30 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/20/why-did-lavabit-shut-down-snowden-email; 
Joseph Pomianowski & Jane Chong, In Order to Protect Users from Intrusive Governments, Apple Has 
Prevented Itself from Unlocking iOS 8 Devices, FORBES.COM (Oct. 16, 2014, 2:56 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/10/16/in-order-to-protect-users-from-repressive-governments-
apple-has-prevented-itself-from-unlocking-ios-8-devices/ (“Enter Apple. Its decision to lock itself out of its 
own devices—and by extension, lock out law enforcement—is an improvement on the oldest vanishing act 
in the book: going offshore.”). But see Andy Greenberg, Whistleblowers Beware: Apps Like Whisper and 
Secret Will Rat You Out, WIRED.COM (May 14, 2014, 3:45 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2014/05/whistleblowers-beware/; Mike Isaac, A Look Behind the Snapchat Photo 
Leak Claims, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Oct. 17, 2014, 7:30 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/a-look-
behind-the-snapchat-photo-leak-claims/ (describing flaws in Snapchat’s privacy features). 
 5. Lee Rainie & Mary Madden, Americans’ Privacy Strategies Post-Snowden, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/03/16/americans-privacy-strategies-post-
snowden/; Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 12, 2014) http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/. 
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online, if it can result in loss of employment, public shaming, and death threats?6 
Those who are most aware of the risks have been minimizing their digital exposure, 
leaving behind those who are least aware. This is a poor outcome. We are forfeiting 
stockpiles of future data because of poor resource management. The data we do 
obtain will be grossly skewed. 
Personal data is like any other resource: incentives need to be aligned to pro-
mote investment.7 While the Big Data industry has grown fat on a wave of initial 
naiveté, we are coming into leaner years as savvier digital natives take over.8 Even 
as data accumulation has become ever more effortless,9 the current generation of 
data innovation has turned toward the pursuit of forgetting and impermanence.10 
Increasingly, resources are being poured into technologies of privacy and anonymi-
ty.11 Companies are being pressed to guard, disregard, or discard user data—a sen-
                                                          
 6. See Choire Sicha, Going Down in Infamy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2015, at BR13 (reviewing 
JON RONSON, SO YOU’VE BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED (2015)); DANIELLE CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN 
CYBERSPACE (2014). 
 7. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354, 356 
(Pap. & Proc. 1967) (“[P]roperty rights arise when it becomes economic for those affected by externalities 
to internalize benefits and costs. . . . This concentration of benefits and costs on owners creates incentives to 
utilize resources more efficiently.”); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 
J.L. & ECON. 265, 275 (1977). 
 8. See DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 56, 70 
(2014) (“The teens that I met genuinely care about their privacy . . . . Many of the privacy strategies that 
teens implement are intended to counter the power dynamic that emerges when parents and other adults feel 
as though they have the right to watch and listen. They shift tools and encode content, use privacy settings, 
and demand privacy.”); JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST 
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 53 (2008); Kate Murphy, We Want Privacy, but Can’t Stop Sharing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2014, at SR4 (“[P]rivacy researchers said they are starting to see signs of a backlash. 
People are beginning to exercise a bit more reserve online or are otherwise engaging in subversive tactics to 
thwart data miners.”). 
 9. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL 
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2006); SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE 
NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2000); BOYD, supra note 8, at 11 (2014) (“Con-
tent shared through social media often sticks around because technologies are designed to enable persis-
tence.”). 
 10. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE (2009); Jonathan Zittrain, Reputation Bankruptcy, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Sept. 7, 2010), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/09/reputation-bankruptcy.html; Jeffrey Rosen, The Web 
Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 19, 2010, at MM30; Case C-131/12, Google Spain 
SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, (May 13, 2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=152065&doclang=EN&cid=144621 (declaring a 
“right to be forgotten”). 
 11. See, e.g., David Gelles, Betting on Security Start-Ups in an Age of Data Breaches, N.Y. 
TIMES BITS (Dec. 2, 2014 9:17 PM) (“Last year, there were 240 investments worth a combined $1.7 billion 
in [security start-ups], up from 83 investments worth just $340 million in 2009, according to CB Insights, a 
research firm that follows venture money.”); Julia Angwin & Emily Steel, Web’s Hot New Commodity: 
Privacy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2011; Stephan Dörner, For German, Swiss Privacy Start-Ups, a Post-
Snowden Boom, WALL ST. J. DIGITS (Aug. 20, 2014, 5:15 AM EST), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/08/20/for-german-swiss-privacy-start-ups-a-post-snowden-boon/; Jonathan 
Mahler, Who Spewed That Abuse? Anonymous Yik Yak Isn’t Telling, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2015, at A1; 
William D. Cohan, In Rise of Yik Yak App, Profits and Ethics Collide, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 7, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/business/dealbook/profits-and-ethics-collide-in-nameless-
turmoil.html (valuing Yik Yak at $200-300 million); Jenna Wortham, Secret Reaches Beyond Tech Set, and 
Raises $25 Million, N.Y. TIMES BITS (July 14, 2014 1:00 PM EST), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/secret-moves-to-broaden-appeal-beyond-the-tech-set-and-raises-
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timent that only a few years ago would have been likened to lighting money on 
fire.12 
This Essay argues that personal information is a resource that must be hus-
banded and cultivated, not slashed and burned. The classic conception of privacy 
pits the individual’s moral right to conceal information against society’s collective 
loss in blocking access to that information.13 Framed that way, privacy has been the 
consistent loser in the court of legislative opinion.14 In response, privacy advocates 
have increasingly reframed privacy as a collective good, not just an individual one. 
While that broadening of privacy’s appeal is a critical shift, more is needed. 
An equally powerful source of inertia has been not just the tension between 
individual versus collective, but the dominant sway of economic reasoning over 
moral rights in contemporary politics.15 Traditionally, economists have attacked 
privacy as a barrier to free information flow, because they have assumed the 
flawed, individualist conception of privacy.16 Rarely is privacy defended on effi-
ciency grounds.17 The gap that needs to be filled is a theory that marshals economic 
arguments to champion the collective societal benefits of restricting free infor-
mation flow. 
Intellectual property law is fertile ground for such theories. In particular, Ed-
mund Kitch’s prospect theory18—an influential theory in patent law—offers a use-
ful framework for translating the social benefits of privacy into economic terms. A 
                                                          
20-million/; Joshua Kopstein, Not All Encryption Apps Are Created Equal, ALJAZEERA AMERICA (Apr. 3, 
2015 2:00 AM EST) http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/4/not-all-encryption-apps-are-created-
equal.html; Elizabeth Dwoskin, Whisper and the Meaning of Anonymity, WALL ST. J. DIGITS (Oct. 28, 
2014, 12:39 PM EST), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/10/28/whisper-and-the-meaning-of-anonymity/. 
 12. See Erin E. Harrison, The Privacy Puzzle, INSIDECOUNSEL (Dec. 22, 2014), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/12/22/the-privacy-puzzle (noting that the FTC’s recommendations on 
effective data security practices include “minimize personal information about consumers” and “de-identify 
as much as possible”). 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1907 (2013) (“The posi-
tive liberty paradigm, moreover, has made little headway within U.S. privacy policy, which is dominated 
instead by a commitment to notice and choice that derives from the negative liberty paradigm.”); PRISCILLA 
REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5–7 (1995) (“The 
number of laws does not reflect enormous policy success by privacy advocates. . . . [T]he actual number of 
laws passed pales in comparison to the amount of congressional activity devoted to the subject and the 
number of laws not passed . . . .”). 
 15. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003); NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M. SALZBERGER, THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2013); William W. Fisher, Theories of 
Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (2001); Mark 
A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2015); Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Stunning Triumph of Cost-Benefit Analysis, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-09-12/the-stunning-triumph-of-cost-benefit-analysis. 
 16. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1979); 
cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011) (“Vermont’s law thus has the effect of prevent-
ing detailers—and only detailers—from communicating with physicians in an effective and informative 
manner.”). 
 17. See generally Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic 
Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381 (1996). 
 18. Not to be confused with prospect theory in behavioral economics as coined by Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky—though the Kahneman/Tversky theory offers useful insights for privacy 
law as well. Cf. Daniel Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1886–88 (2013). 
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prospect theory of privacy offers at least two insights that alter the economic analy-
sis. The first is the opportunity cost of secrecy. The absence of legal protection 
does not diminish demand for privacy; it merely drives up the price. Accordingly, 
recognizing legal claims saves the considerable expense of investing in non-legal 
means of maintaining secrecy, which can then be used more productively else-
where. The second is the opportunity cost of future information relative to present 
information. When the production of future information depends on privacy, a loss 
in privacy means a loss in future information. Prospect theory helps illuminate that 
the information we have in hand may not be fully vested, and that an early period 
of exclusivity can be useful in allowing further discoveries beneath the surface. Too 
often—in privacy discussions as well as in intellectual property discussions—cost-
benefit analyses are heavily biased toward the losses associated with information 
that is already known, and have much greater difficulty assessing the benefits of 
future information that is as yet unknown. 
II. PYRRHIC PURITY 
Privacy differs from other areas of information law in that it has remained 
strongly wedded to moral intuition.19 That commitment has come at a cost: privacy 
protections remain essentially toothless.20 By stark contrast, other areas of infor-
mation law have been wildly successful during that same period of time. Patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and even publicity rights have shifted uni-
formly away from moral grounds to economic reasoning, and each has become 
dramatically more robust as a consequence.21 Nevertheless, it remains highly unu-
sual to defend privacy rights on anything but moral grounds.22 Privacy rights are 
                                                          
 19. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the 
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 969–70 (1989); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Prop-
erty?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1148 (2000) (“A moral rights-like approach might be worth considering as to 
personal data.”). 
 20. See supra note 14; Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in 
Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 391–94 (2003) (describing existing federal and state 
regulations as “piecemeal” and “[a]dopted in response to specific violations and concerns relating to a 
particular industry” rather than being “based on any uniform theory of rights”). 
 21. See generally Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property 
Law 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000); see also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement 
in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1034–35 (1997) (“As the term ‘intellectual property’ 
settles over the traditional legal disciplines of patents, copyrights, and trademarks and encroaches as well 
into such neighboring bodies of law as trade secrets, the right of publicity, misappropriation, unfair compe-
tition, and idea submissions, courts and scholars increasingly turn to the legal and economic literature of 
tangible property law to justify—or to modify—the rules of intellectual property.”); Amy Kapczynski, The 
Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 981 
(2012) (“IP scholarship today responds primarily to the value of efficiency, and it generally conceives of IP 
as a means to generate incentives for the production of information. Although copyright, patent, trade se-
cret, and trademark were not always thought of as conjoined areas of law, the rubric of information has 
been used to unite them by relying on a common analysis of the peculiar economic qualities of infor-
mation.”); cf. Madhavi Sunder, IP, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 261 (2006) (critiquing the fact that “legal schol-
ars continue to understand intellectual property as solely a tool to solve an economic ‘public goods’ prob-
lem”). 
 22. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495–2496, 573 U.S. __ (2014) (“Modern cell 
phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they 
hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’ The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry 
such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the 
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the opposite of publicity rights; no economic market should exist for information 
that wants to be private. And if such a market does exist, then the information being 
traded must not be very private after all. Perhaps there is a lesson to be learned. 
The canonical literature frames privacy as an individual right to control pri-
vate information (or correspondingly as a negative duty upon others not to access 
such information).23 Typically, those views have relied on natural law conceptions 
to determine how far the right/duty should reach.24 We like to imagine that personal 
information about us belongs to us, and that we alone should choose how it may be 
shared. We “deserve” such power because the information at issue is intimately tied 
to our personality. Who else could stake a stronger claim than that?25 We are of-
fended when a nosy neighbor asks about our business; outraged when a lover 
snoops on our devices; and creeped out when confronted by advertisements that 
track our internet history a little too closely. 
The individualist model is deeply appealing on a gut level, yet its flaws are 
amply documented.26 The modern consensus is that enforcing privacy solely on the 
basis of “what the individual wants” is woefully inadequate. When privacy is de-
fined strictly in terms of individual choice, the issue is reduced to notice and con-
sent.27 Because individuals differ in their judgments, it is easy to become agnostic 
                                                          
Founders fought.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (“These references show an emerging 
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private 
lives in matters pertaining to sex.”); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) 
(“[A]nonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advo-
cacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our 
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hope-
fully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, 
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. 
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”); Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 631–32 (1886) (“And any compulsory discovery . . . is contrary to the principles of a 
free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an Amer-
ican. It may suit the purposes of despotic power, but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty 
and personal freedom.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890); ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Charles Fried, Privacy: A Moral Analysis, 77 
YALE L.J. 475 (1968); see also HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND 
THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 70–71 (2010) (“most of what is written about privacy assumes it to be a 
form of control” over information about oneself); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 24 (2008) 
(“One of the most predominant theories of privacy is that of control over personal information.”); Cohen, 
supra note 14, at 1907 (“Most privacy theorists have tended to think that the key to defining privacy lies in 
locating privacy’s essence in one or another overarching principle (such as liberty, inaccessibility, or con-
trol) . . . .”). 
 24. See SOLOVE, supra note 23, at 12–13 (classifying six general conceptions of privacy: (1) the 
right to be let alone, (2) limited access to self, (3) secrecy, (4) control over personal information, (5) protec-
tion of one’s personhood, and (6) intimacy). 
 25. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1849, 1858-59 (2007) (“Rules making nearness and physical control the criteria for possession have a 
psychological basis, and the convention of respecting possession stems from people’s mutual expectations 
that they will respect the right to control these things.”). 
 26. See generally REGAN, supra note 14; Anita L. Allen, Privacy-as-Data Control: Conceptual, 
Practical, and Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861 (2000). 
 27. Cf. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 1879 (2013); Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary but Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for Privacy 
Notice and Choice, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273 (2012); see also Robert H. Sloan & Richard 
Warner, Beyond Notice and Choice: Privacy, Norms, and Consent, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 370 (2014). 
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as to whether any given data should be shared or not. As long as the individual has 
“consented,” other concerns are swept off the table. Thus, much of the discussion 
turns on whether individuals are being given an opportunity to consent, and wheth-
er that consent is meaningful.28 Yet even assuming consent is voluntarily obtained, 
the behavioral literature shows that individuals do not always act in their own best 
interest.29 Moreover, many individuals are in an unfair bargaining position relative 
to those with more sophistication, money, or influence.30 Critics have pointed out 
that consent-based models lead to disproportionate exploitation of vulnerable popu-
lations—the same reason for banning voluntary contracts for activities such as child 
labor, prostitution, organ sales, and other forms of bodily subjugation.31 
At the same time, the individualist model is not just underprotective but also 
overbroad. It idealizes the amount of control any given individual can exercise be-
fore colliding into the overlapping claims of others. Individual rights never exist in 
a vacuum; they necessarily touch on the concerns of other individuals.32 A right to 
speak freely conflicts with a right to keep things unspoken, for example.33 Commu-
nitarian critiques have pointed out that individual preferences must be balanced 
against countervailing societal needs.34 Insisting dogmatically that privacy rights 
must be respected at all costs is tone deaf, because it is both impracticable and dys-
topian. 
Frustrated with the shortcomings of the individualist construct of privacy, a 
wave of post-liberal scholarship has sought to expand the conception of privacy’s 
value beyond just the individual. The “self” is an artificial construct; we do not 
                                                          
 28. See Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 821–28 (2000) 
(describing key failings of notice-and-consent schemes); M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Pri-
vacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2013); Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach 
to Privacy Online, DAEDALUS, Fall 2011, at 32 (“I am not convinced that notice-and-consent, however 
refined, will result in better privacy online as long as it remains a procedural mechanism divorced from the 
particularities of relevant online activity.”). 
 29. See Alessandro Acquisiti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us 
About Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES, AND PRACTICES 363 (Alessandro Acquisi-
ti et al. eds., 2008); Kirsten Martin, Privacy Notices as Tabula Rasa: An Empirical Investigation into How 
Complying with a Privacy Notice Is Related to Meeting Privacy Expectations Online, __ J. PUB. POL’Y & 
MKTG. __ (forthcoming). See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011); RICHARD 
H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND 
HAPPINESS (2008); DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2008). 
 30. See generally JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU (2012); PASQUALE, supra note 9; Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010 (2013); Mary Anne Franks, 
Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224 (2011). 
 31. Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, The Subject and Object of Commodification, in 
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE (Martha M. Ertman & 
Joan C. Williams eds. 2005); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). 
 32. See generally Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence 
from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975 (1982). 
 33. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 23, at 87 (“[P]rivacy conflicts with other fundamental values, 
such as free speech, security, curiosity, and transparency . . . .”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections 
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967 (2003); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 34. See Posner, supra note 16. Compare SOLOVE, supra note 23, at 90–91 (“The problem with 
communitarianism is that it pits the individual against the common good.”). 
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exist in isolation from the community around us.35 Our identities are defined by our 
relationships with others, just as others are defined by us.36 Accordingly, many 
leading privacy scholars have embraced instead a theory of “constitutive” privacy, 
in which privacy’s value is expressed not just in terms of any single individual, but 
as the mutual shaping performed by society and its constituent members.37 Privacy 
is not in tension with societal goals; it furthers mutual goals such as civility, demo-
cratic self-governance, and innovation.38 Similarly, Helen Nissenbaum describes 
privacy as the ongoing pursuit of contextual equilibrium: as new technologies and 
new developments disrupt preexisting norms, we call on privacy to “preserve the 
integrity of the social contexts in which we live our lives.”39 
In short, privacy is much more than an individual right to secrecy or control; 
it is a collective engine that fosters, mediates, and integrates social progress. While 
current approaches have undoubtedly pushed privacy theory in the right direction, 
they have yet to find meaningful purchase among policymakers. Privacy’s positive 
effects do not erase its negative specter, and moral rhetoric alone does not inform 
lawmakers how to draw difficult lines. Legal protections for privacy remain ane-
mic. Moral rhetoric may help each of us articulate what we think privacy is for, but 
it has been remarkably unsuccessful at enlisting legislative consensus.40 In the ab-
sence of overt legal protections, the natural fallbacks are various forms of secre-
cy—technological defenses, enforced vows of silence, or self-censorship. Privacy 
should not be synonymous with secrecy, but it has become so. 
III. PROMOTING THE PROGRESS OF PRIVACY 
The relative paucity of economic literature on privacy is conspicuous. Much 
of what does exist grapples with the outdated individualist model of privacy. What 
is needed is an economic theory of privacy that incorporates the constitutive value 
of privacy beyond the individual cost-benefit. As a general rule, intellectual proper-
ty theory is well-suited to that task. In particular, extending prospect theory from 
patent law to privacy law lends some useful insights. 
                                                          
 35. See Cohen, supra note 14, at 1906 (“The self who benefits from privacy is not the autono-
mous, precultural island that the liberal individualist model presumes.”); SOLOVE, supra note 23, at 91 
(“We do not live in isolation, but among others, and social engagement is a necessary part of life.”). See 
generally Bryan H. Choi, For Whom the Data Tolls: A Reunified Theory of Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2015). 
 36. Cohen, supra note 14, at 1910–11. 
 37. SOLOVE, supra note 23, at 91–93; Schwartz, supra note 28, at 834–35; JULIE COHEN, 
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012). 
 38. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 14, at 1927 (“[P]rivacy does not only protect individuals. Priva-
cy furthers fundamental public policy goals relating to liberal democratic citizenship, innovation, and hu-
man flourishing, and those purposes must be taken into account when making privacy policy.”); Paul 
Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1613 (1999); Post, supra note 
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 39. NISSENBAUM, supra note 23, at 161–66, 186; see also Andrew Selbst, Contextual Expecta-
tions of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643, 650–54 (2013). 
 40. Cf. Murphy, supra note 17, at 2389–90 (“Warren and Brandeis’s success in finding a natural 
right to privacy (or personality) separable from property rights was the cause of the [privacy] tort’s eventual 
failure. . . . Courts proved comfortable with rights characterized as property, but blanched at amorphous and 
‘inalienable’ rights such as the right to control one’s personality.”). 
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In 1977, Edmund Kitch published a seminal paper offering an economic justi-
fication for allowing early patent claiming before the value of the information is 
fully realized.41 Kitch’s key insight was that certain kinds of worthy investments in 
information cannot be achieved through secrecy alone.42 Secrecy is always an 
available option, of course. But a legal system that depends only on secrecy is less 
efficient at generating socially productive information than a system that supple-
ments secrecy with early exclusivity. 
Kitch contrasted two possible functions of a patent claim system.43 Previous 
scholars had touted the reward function, i.e., that an inventor should be rewarded 
for the successful achievement of a worthy invention, so that he may capture his 
returns on investment.44 In essence, the reward function is a backward-looking the-
ory that seeks to protect the vested value of a completed invention. Kitch observed, 
however, that the reward theory failed to explain certain aspects of the patent sys-
tem as it was actually practiced.45 
Instead, Kitch proposed an alternate, forward-looking theory: a prospect func-
tion that allows early claiming in order to draw future investment toward an area of 
interest.46 The purpose of the patent system was not just to reimburse value 
achieved before the patent grant but also to push claimants to extract new value 
after the patent grant.47 In particular, Kitch drew upon an analogy to mining claims 
in the American West during the late 1800s.48 Because oil could not be easily de-
tected from the surface, large investments in drilling needed to be made before any 
exclusive rights could be claimed.49 To encourage such investments, miners were 
permitted to obtain mining claims prior to showing that the land had any commer-
cial significance. Doing so afforded miners greater certainty over their ownership 
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 46. Id. at 266. 
 47. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129, 132 (2004) (describing Kitch’s prospect theory as an “ex post” theory that “encourage[es] 
efficient use of existing works rather than the creation of new works”) [hereinafter Lemley, Ex Ante versus 
Ex Post]; A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 281 (1995) (referring to prospect theory as a “post-classical theory”); J.H. 
Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 163 (1997) 
(“The more that subpatentable innovation falls through the cracks of the classical intellectual property sys-
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 48. Kitch, supra note 41, at 271–75. 
 49. Id. at 273. 
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rights in the face of uncertain economic valuations.50 Unpromising claims could be 
abandoned and returned to the public domain.51 
Kitch listed several reasons a patent “prospect” is more advantageous than se-
crecy. Relevant to the present discussion were: first, that a patent system reduces 
the costs of maintaining secrecy; second, that a patent system encourages develop-
ment of ideas that cannot be easily kept secret; and third, that legal recognition of 
claims facilitates sharing of information and reduces duplication of effort.52 Those 
who obtain a patent claim are spared the expense of having to guard their secrets 
with lockboxes and nondisclosure agreements.53 That capital could be redirected 
elsewhere. More importantly, by reducing dependence on secrecy as the sole pro-
tective measure, a prospect system fosters sustained investment in projects even 
when they are impossible to keep secret until completion. A research effort that 
otherwise might be abandoned for futility becomes feasible again. That protection 
also encourages voluntary exchange of information and reduces wasteful duplica-
tion of efforts to generate knowledge that others have previously extracted. The 
purpose of furnishing legal protection was not to enhance secrecy, but to obviate it. 
Those considerations are recognized even under trade secret doctrine, where 
courts have relaxed the requirement of absolute secrecy so long as reasonable ef-
forts are made to guard the information.54 The general consensus has been that re-
quiring perfect secrecy is untenable because it encourages tactics that are costly and 
unreasonable to defend against.55 To hold otherwise would force companies to as-
sume unreasonable risks, to the point where many would refuse to enter entire lines 
of business because it has ceased to be economically rational to do so. When the 
expense of guarding information exceeds any potential revenue, no rational actor 
would invest in developing such information.  
Those lessons are readily extended from trade secret and patent law to privacy 
law.56 Secrecy has long been the main mechanism of privacy protection. As long as 
one holds one’s cards close to one’s chest, no one else is the wiser. But today’s data 
mining, behavioral tracking, and surveillance technologies have made secrecy more 
difficult and costly to maintain. 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 274–75. 
 51. Id. at 274. 
 52. Id. at 279. 
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Raising the cost of data secrecy leads to two outcomes—both suboptimal. The 
first is an arms race: as surveillance technologies encroach on private interests, 
those who wish to resist can choose to expend increasing amounts of labor and cap-
ital to counter those effects. In the physical context, inventive minds have devised 
entire cottage industries of masks, walls, locks, and alarms. In the virtual context, 
the equivalents have been proxies, firewalls, encryptions, and alerts. Those with 
technical skill and financial resources have doubled down.57 As more attention and 
effort is poured into the collection and analysis of data, the software community 
has responded in kind with countermeasures that are increasingly sophisticated and 
expensive. On the one hand, the technologies of obfuscation are better than they 
have ever been. On the other hand, those efforts and resources could be spared and 
redirected elsewhere. 
The second outcome is surrender: those without technical or financial means 
will accept that they are unable to protect their private information, and they will 
stop resisting. A world without privacy leads to blandification of the mainstream 
and marginalization of the alternatives.58 It reinforces conformity and chills ideas 
that deviate from the norm.59 There is little incentive to develop one’s own person-
ality—unless one is already outcast. The result is an overall loss in individual agen-
cy, diversity of ideas, and progress of knowledge. 
Legal recognition of privacy “prospects” could help stabilize those problems 
by offering a supplemental form of information protection, just as the patent system 
complements the trade secrecy regime. One should not have to prove secrecy—or 
even reasonable efforts at secrecy—in order to stake a privacy claim. Nor should 
one have to prove personal, subjective desire for privacy in the claimed infor-
mation. Instead, such value should be presumptive unless the claim is “abandoned” 
due to factors such as waiver, commercial use, death, or sufficient expiry of time.  
To be sure, such protection would shrink the public domain by some quantifi-
able measure. Private information would no longer become subject to public use 
simply by virtue of having been leaked. Then again, all informational rights shrink 
the public domain, and that short-term loss is compensated by a longer-term socie-
tal gain.60 A traditional reward theory analysis undervalues that quid pro quo, by 
accounting for only the known universe of information. By contrast, a prospect 
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theory analysis is more complete because it accounts for the potential of exclusivity 
to spawn future information that otherwise would go undiscovered. A person who 
suffers a bout of depression or illness,61 or engages in sexually transgressive acts, 
or reads a subversive pamphlet,62 or breaks with the accepted norm in any manner 
has generated some private data. But the societal value of that data is not necessari-
ly ripest at the instant moment it comes into being. Allowing some period of matu-
ration can pay future dividends that are more meaningful than a superficial mosaic 
cobbled together from haphazard parts.63 
IV. PANNING THE PANNERS 
In extending a utilitarian approach to privacy theory, several objections can 
be anticipated. One set of questions is whether an incentives-based model is appro-
priate for personal data: many forms of personal data are created automatically 
without any incentive at all, and those that do depend on incentive may be socially 
undesirable. Another longstanding debate concerns whether propertization is a pru-
dent model to extend to personal data, especially in light of the problems that have 
developed in intellectual property law. A final reservation raised is whether cham-
pioning a utilitarian approach is incompatible with the moral rights traditions. This 
Part takes each of those objections in turn. 
A. Wrong Incentives? 
As a threshold matter, one might ask whether personal data differs from pa-
tentable inventions and copyrightable works, in that the former is generated as a 
natural byproduct of living—our facial features, our DNA and fingerprints, our 
blood, our biometric data—whereas the latter are not. No amount of incentive can 
alter the presence or absence of data “constants” that either exist or not. Courts 
have repeatedly relied on this type of reasoning to hold that such fixed information 
is a “foregone conclusion” and thus cannot be shielded as private.64 
A first-order response is to point out that other kinds of personal data do re-
spond to incentives—our actions, our habits, our preferences, our thoughts. Moreo-
ver, even if biometric data is fixed, the collection and use of biometric data has 
second-order effects that influence our behavior. The fallacy here is to view data as 
inert in relation to the past without considering its potential to have future effects. 
Prospect theory helps correct for hindsight bias by championing a forward-looking 
perspective on information production.  
The main line of attack, however, has come from older economic treatments 
of privacy, which have been highly skeptical of privacy as an inefficient restraint 
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2015] SYMPOSIUM EDITION 635 
 
against free information flow.65 Not all private information is the kind of infor-
mation we want to promote as a society.66 Information is often concealed in fur-
therance of criminal acts, or because of shame and other reputational fears. Richard 
Posner has argued that a person should not be entitled to conceal discreditable facts 
(such as a criminal past or a history of bankruptcies) that lower the person’s valua-
tion to others.67 Justice Scalia has complained that anonymity “facilitates wrong by 
eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the very purpose of the anonymi-
ty.”68 We give exclusive rights to inventors and authors because we believe their 
ideas are socially useful; perhaps that reasoning does not extend to information that 
is actively harmful to others.69 Perhaps it is wiser to discourage socially disruptive 
ideas. For example, if a lawyer knows a client has murderous intent, or a doctor 
knows an airline pilot is suffering depression, why should such information be pro-
tected a la works of fine art? 
The difficulty lies in measurement of value. Most economic analyses weigh 
only the cost of disclosure upon the individual (an abstract dignitary harm) against 
the cost of nondisclosure upon society (a concrete, measurable harm such as num-
ber of lives lost).70 Those analyses commit the same errors that early privacy theo-
rists made of characterizing privacy as a zero-sum game. A more nuanced analysis 
is needed. 
Again, prospect theory offers a helpful lens by bridging constitutive theory 
and economic theory. Shielding private information—even “disreputable” infor-
mation—is the equivalent of investing in an idea that has zero or negative value at 
present, but which may yield net positive value in the future. Premature disclosure 
is undesirable because it cuts short productive explorations before they can prove 
their worth. On the other hand, when the net present value is clearly negative—as 
in the example of the murderous client—prospect theory would support immediate 
forfeiture of the privacy claim. Conversely, when the net present value is over-
whelmingly positive, as in the case of newsworthy items or other matters of great 
public interest, then the privacy interest in nurturing future dividends must yield to 
the present need. 
Furthermore, typical economic analysis does not account for the macro costs 
associated with not protecting privacy. If we can assume demand for privacy is 
highly inelastic, then consumers are willing to pay substantial amounts to obtain 
privacy. As Kitch noted, “it is difficult to imagine any system—absent the most 
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draconian and costly measures—that would reduce the phenomenon of secrecy to 
an insignificant level.”71 The more sensitive the information, the more people will 
pay to guard it. The greater the consequences of inadvertent disclosure, the more 
people will pay to limit their exposure to risk. And on the other side, those interest-
ed in thwarting those defenses must increase their spending as well. Total economic 
waste in expenditures can quickly spiral out of proportion.72 An economic analysis 
of privacy requires appraising not only the social cost of protecting data, but also 
the social cost of withholding legal protection. In the end, legal recognition of pri-
vacy claims may prove the more prudent fiscal choice. 
B. Wrong Mechanism? 
Setting aside whether the production of private information is worth incentiv-
izing, a separate challenge is whether propertization is the appropriate mechanism 
for doing so. The dominant objection against propertization of privacy has been 
that it would promote too much sharing of information.73 As Jessica Litman has 
written, “We deem something property in order to facilitate its transfer. If we don’t 
intend the item to be transferred, then we needn’t treat it as property at all.”74 By 
assigning information a property value, it becomes a commodity for sale—and 
once it can be sold, it will be sold.75 Thus, privacy absolutists argue that private 
information should never be commodified in the first place.76 The point of protect-
ing private information is that it is private; allowing it to be freely traded seems 
contrary to the spirit. 
On a pragmatic level, that ship has sailed. Data is already commodified; ro-
bust markets exist for the purchase and exchange of personal data.77 It is unrealistic 
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a ban on data trade”). 
 77. See PASQUALE, supra note 9; Natasha Singer, You for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at 
BU1. 
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to imagine returning to a bygone era in which personal data is inalienable. If data 
can be traded freely by third parties, it seems perverse to disallow trading by first 
persons. Any such disparity rests on the false conception of privacy-as-secrecy. 
Information that is actually kept secret does not require legal protection; privacy is 
concerned with an independent subset of data that is only reasonably kept secret.  
That said, to the extent there are special concerns regarding the initial transfer 
of information, those concerns could be mitigated by limiting the privacy claim to 
exclude any information sold or bartered for value (such as for discount coupons or 
free content). Propertization would extend only up to the point of sale, at which 
point it would expire. In this way, the privacy claim could accommodate both the 
ideal of discouraging alienation by first persons and the reality of commodification 
by third parties. 
Interestingly, in intellectual property scholarship, the most pointed attacks 
have been that property rights block too much sharing of information.78 Once a 
property claim is assigned, it divides the world into those who are valid claimants 
and those who are not. The claimants receive a right to exclude others from using 
the claimed information.79 Accordingly, many prominent patent and copyright 
scholars have worried that too much information has come under exclusive proprie-
torship.80 They have pointed to problems of thickets and cross-licensing, as well as 
uncertainties surrounding fair use, which diminish opportunities for communal re-
use and remixing of information.81 
The challenges of negotiating overlapping privacy claims are undeniable. An-
yone who wishes to pass along gossip, publish a memoir, conduct research using 
personal data, manage user-generated content, or share any information at all would 
have to sort through conflicting privacy claims. Therefore one might well ask: Why 
extend the woes of intellectual property law to privacy law? Yet this would be a 
strange critique for privacy advocates to raise, because it would mean their efforts 
have been too successful—hardly the challenge today.  
Nevertheless, a distinction could be drawn between commercial and non-
commercial uses, as it has been to a limited extent in intellectual property law.82 
Noncommercial uses cover most of the ordinary interactions we have historically 
carried on. And although noncommercial disclosures can be devastating on an indi-
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vidual level, the commercial profit motive is more systematically problematic be-
cause it drives up repetition and scale. 
More generally, however, these conflict considerations are precisely the ques-
tions that must be confronted under any data privacy regime. There is no easy 
avoidance. The best we can do is to set good defaults that minimize the need to 
overturn initial allocations of rights. If intellectual property serves as a historical 
lesson, a robust privacy right would most likely reduce nonconsensual disclosures, 
while encouraging more voluntary disclosures. This is the outcome privacy law 
should want. 
C. Wrong Justification? 
But the most formidable objection to overcome may be that cost-benefit anal-
ysis is insensitive or repugnant to the moral attributes of privacy. Many in the pri-
vacy community are deeply skeptical of reducing privacy to numerical terms, be-
cause they worry it flattens and distorts the robust nature of privacy. Some things 
cannot be quantified, and those ineffable qualities cannot be factored into any cost-
benefit equation. 
This is a fair criticism. The best—and perhaps only—response is to point out 
that cost-benefit analysis can be in alliance with other moral approaches. They need 
not be in tension. The purpose of this Essay has been to point out that moral indig-
nity has been remarkably ineffective at promoting actual privacy protections, and 
that economic reasoning may be better equipped to achieve the same, desired re-
sults. While there may be differences further down the road, why not hitch the 
wagons together as far as they will go? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Private information is valuable precisely because it is information the public 
cannot produce. Stories of shame, of stigma, of failure—these are stories that are 
tremendously helpful when shared with others who are undergoing the same trau-
ma. Under premature scrutiny, these stories wither and cannot be cultivated or later 
shared. Without privacy, knowledge is lost. We are afraid to admit our own internal 
struggles; we marginalize those who can offer insight; and we are slow to learn 
from the mistakes of others. Whether it is treatment options for stigmatized illness-
es, existential doubts, advice for difficult relationships, or coping mechanisms for 
bereavement, we fall into familiar patterns instead of standing on the shoulders of 
confidants. 
How can we transcend those samsaric cycles of human ignorance? The same 
way we have achieved all other kinds of progress: by compiling libraries of infor-
mation. Big Data is not the enemy. It is a tool; a technology. But all technologies 
must be used with care. The world’s most advanced tractor is of little use in a field 
of weeds. Privacy is a mechanism for allowing some fields to lie fallow, for a lim-
ited time, so that they can turn more fruitful in future years. As we evolve from 
data gatherers into data farmers, we must become more mindful of data sustainabil-
ity. 
